Geopolitical symptoms of COVID-19: Narrative battles within the Eastern Partnership. Bertelsmann/Stiftung Policy Brief | 08.04.2020 by Kosmehl, Miriam
  
flashlight europe 
 
 
 
 
The spread of the latest Coronavirus strain is not simply a health crisis. It has 
long taken on a geopolitical dimension. China and Russia are engaged in a 
‘global battle of narratives’ over who is the most generous international power. 
In the geopolitical competition for Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, the 
European Union (EU) struggles to cut a good figure. The COVID-19 crisis could 
bring an EaP crisis. 
 
 
As countries around the world scale up 
efforts to prevent the overwhelming of their 
health systems, a global form of ‘health 
diplomacy’ is taking shape. China and 
Russia are challenging the EU in a battle of 
narratives to win the hearts and minds of 
those most vulnerable to the virus by 
delivering the most medical aid and 
equipment. In this battle, not only actions, 
but also perceptions decide who the winners 
and losers are. 
 
The ‘masks policy’ also targets the EaP, 
which is a multilateral framework developed 
by the EU involving countries from Eastern 
Europe and the South Caucasus. These 
countries are particularly vulnerable to 
COVID-19 and its side effects, including 
widespread disinformation. As the virus is 
here to stay for an unpredictable amount of 
time, the unfolding crisis might affect the 
EU’s credibility and attractiveness with long-
term negative consequences for the EaP.  
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The EU’s credibility and attractivity on 
trial – COVID-19 as a stress test 
 
The EU’s reaction to COVID-19 is unlikely to 
be considered a point of reference by EaP 
countries. In the absence of an EU-wide 
response mechanism, Member States 
displayed a lack of unity and coordination in 
the early days of the pandemic. Borders re-
acquired their ancient meaning of protective 
walls against foreign threats, which came 
with a high price tag. Unevenly and 
independently from one another, EU 
countries have restricted the right to free 
movement, one of the most emblematic 
achievements of European integration. 
 
In contrast, China’s allegedly effective crisis 
response is likely to be perceived as a better 
alternative. At the same time, Russian 
authorities report low numbers of infections 
and reject local media reports, indicating 
COVID-19 might be spreading fast, as fake 
news. This might raise many eyebrows in 
Western Europe. However, EaP countries, 
which are geographically closer to Russia 
and more exposed to its state-controlled 
media, are prone to choosing another 
interpretation: whereas in the EU everything 
is chaotic, China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s 
Vladimir Putin have everything under 
control.  
 
This perception could reboot the continuing 
competition between democratic and 
authoritarian governance models. 
Transparent, yet lengthy, decision-making 
processes, in which individual freedoms and 
collective security must be carefully weighed 
to ensure each measure’s proportionality, 
are tested against those allowing less time-
consuming, yet freedom-constraining, 
decisions without checks and balances. To 
deal effectively with crises, democracies 
must proclaim states of emergency granting 
the authorities powers that clash with the 
very democratic principles underpinning 
them: restrictions on freedom of movement 
and assembly, privacy and the right to vote.  
While democracies demonstrate that they 
cannot contain the spread without resorting 
to such measures, authoritarian systems 
seem to experience their finest hour.  
 
This narrative that autocracies are 'better 
equipped' to deal with crises finds a 
particularly fertile ground in post-Soviet 
countries with a preference for ‘strong’ 
leaders, limited media pluralism and 
independence and a weak civil society. In 
Belarus and Azerbaijan, strongmen like 
Lukashenko and Aliyev have decided to 
follow Russia’s way of dealing with the 
crisis. In countries with semi-functioning 
democracies such as Armenia, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine, China and Russia’s 
allegedly successful crisis management may 
well enhance their ‘soft power’ at the 
expense of the EU.  
 
Political leaders from the EaP could also be 
inspired by examples from within the EU. 
Viktor Orban from Hungary, Boyko Borisov 
from Bulgaria and Mateusz Morawiecki from 
Poland are misusing the ‘temporary’ 
restrictive measures to further their 
nationalist and populist agenda. First signs 
of such a negative spill-over are already 
visible in Moldova. The country’s pro-
Russian President Igor Dodon, who faces 
re-election later this year, has declared a 
state of emergency whose material and 
temporal scope of application goes beyond 
what would be necessary and could target 
‘unwanted media opinion’.  
 
Public relations battle – room for 
improvement in EU communications 
strategy  
 
The EU is losing the information battle, 
triggered by China and Russia, over who is 
the most generous international partner in 
the EaP. It is true that on 30 March 2020 the 
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EU announced an emergency support 
package amounting to €840 million to tackle 
the virus and its short- and medium-term 
effects. This assistance is of great 
importance since all EaP countries, to a 
varying degree, suffer from a weak 
healthcare system, lack administrative 
capacities and have limited budgetary room 
for maneuver to cushion the shock for their 
economies.  
 
However, a golden rule for successful public 
relations is ‘to get your story out first’. Earlier 
than the EU, China and Russia announced 
they would deliver aid for Moldova and 
Ukraine amidst the global scramble for 
medical and personal protective equipment. 
At that point, Schengen Area Member 
States had already decided on closing the 
external borders to their Eastern neighbours 
for an initial period of 30 days. From one day 
to the next, the suspension of visa-free 
travel for Georgian, Moldovan and Ukrainian 
citizens puts the most tangible benefit of the 
EaP on hold.  
 
Another factor in effective public diplomacy 
is the power of visual content, which is 
intuitive and easy to retrieve. Whereas the 
loads of supplies covered with Chinese 
flags, the trucks decorated with Russian-
Italian flags and the medical staff 
descending military planes engrave 
themselves on people’s memories, 
Commission announcements built around 
dry figures are less able to win over hearts 
and minds. Even though EU assistance will 
likely turn out more effective, both in terms 
of quantity and quality, China and Russia 
have so far shown they know better how to 
maximize the geopolitical cost-benefit ratio.  
 
Western societies are likely to debunk China 
and Russia´s ostentatiously energetic 
deliveries of masks, tests and ventilation 
machines as media-effective Trojan horses 
in a battle for geopolitical influence and 
nation branding. EaP societies, in contrast, 
might be happy to take up the narrative that, 
while European solidarity initially appeared 
to be a rare commodity, China and Russia 
generously helped them in their darkest 
hour. 
 
Looking ahead – avoiding the crisis post-
crisis  
 
Global recession, destabilized national 
security, social tensions – the expected 
effects of COVID-19 are already blowing 
wind in the sails of globalization critics. As in 
the past, in times of great struggle, human 
nature tends to retreat to the perceived 
comfort of its own small community. If 
European integration is understood as 
globalization on a small scale, then 
unsettling times await the EaP. While ‘social 
distancing’ is the command of the hour, 
neither EaP countries nor the EU can afford 
neighborhood distancing. 
 
The strategic relevance of the EaP will not 
vanish once the COVID-19 crisis is over. 
The framework is of high importance for the 
aspirations of reform-minded EaP countries 
to become European-style democracies with 
a functioning rule of law framework and 
access to the EU internal market. This refers 
in particular to Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine, which have signed highly beneficial 
Association Agreements. For these 
countries integration with Europe will remain 
a priority after COVID-19. The EU’s external 
policy objective of creating stability and 
prosperity at its borders, an EaP priority, will 
even take on more relevance since the virus 
is expected to have a particularly strong 
impact on the EU’s Eastern neighborhood.  
 
Therefore, the EU should, first, stop 
conceptualizing the EaP as a 'good deed'. 
Decision-makers should be reminded that 
the EaP is founded on the premise that the 
EU and its neighborhood are 
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interdependent. Exporting stability and 
prosperity costs less than importing 
instability and poverty. Just as the EU is not 
a good Samaritan but rather a community of 
interests, so the EaP is not an altruistic 
project but an investment whose returns will 
impact – positively or negatively – the EU 
itself. In the battle of narratives, the EU 
cannot afford to lose the EaP. 
 
Second, the EU should include strategic 
communications as a separate priority item 
within its agenda for 2019-2024. Strategic 
communications at institutional level would 
imply better transmission of information on 
EU actions, clearer definition of narratives 
and more decisively countering 
disinformation/tackling misinformation. 
Instead of ´listening´ first, the Commission's 
Directorate-General Communication (DG 
COMM) should become more pro-active and 
focus on advertising and marketing its 
messages. The EU’s messages need to be 
simple, comprehensible and widely 
disseminated. Juxtaposing the EU’s reaction 
and China’s active narrative-shaping in the 
COVID-19 crisis clearly shows that the EU is 
unable to ‘sell itself’, with a likely impact on 
public opinion for years to come. This is a 
serious blow for the von der Leyen 
Commission, whose key objective is to be a 
‘geopolitical Commission’ and create a 
stronger Europe in the world. 
 
Third, the EU’s credibility, marked by the 
degree of its success in upholding 
democracy, rule of law and human rights 
within its borders, is of paramount 
importance for its ability to be a 
transformative power and to promote 
European values and norms beyond its 
borders. How can the EU credibly and 
legitimately ask its Eastern neighbours to 
comply with European values, if Member 
States refuse to do so? When EU countries 
misuse the current crisis and decide to play 
with democratic rules, rather than by them, 
the Commission should swiftly and 
resolutely make use of the legal toolbox on 
hand. This includes the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism (CVM), Rule of Law 
Framework, infringement proceedings 
before the European Court of Justice and, 
as a last resort, Art. 7 of the Treaty on the 
European Union. As this toolbox is far from 
adequate, the crisis should be turned into an 
opportunity to engage in an all-
encompassing dialogue on new instruments, 
which could then be successfully exported to 
the EaP. Protecting EU founding values 
requires continuous, enhanced and 
cumulative engagement on behalf of the 
supranational institutions of the Union, the 
Member States and EU citizens. Rather than 
adopting a “nobody’s perfect” approach, the 
EU must lead by example. 
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Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this 
analysis are those of the authors and do not 
reflect the views of their employers. 
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